"The Aceh Dispute and Its Peace Agreement Process”

1. Introduction

The conflict between the Indonesia government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM/Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) had exited for almost 30 years. It was begun 1976 when Teungku Hasan di Tiro proclaimed the movement as dissatisfaction of unequal development and policy in Aceh region. Jakarta (as the central government of Indonesia) obtained many benefits from oil and gas resources while many Acehnese still lived in poverty and remained uneducated. When the Acehnese anger led to rebellion, the Jakarta government sent troops whose acted brutally and made the condition worse. In 1989, the Military Operations Zone (DOM) was implemented as the government responded to critical situation in Aceh. For the next ten years, when Indonesia faced the economy and political crisis, the rebellion became dauntless and got sympathy from Acehnese people. During the period of 2000 – 2005 there are several agreements to resolve the conflict. All of the agreements were done with the mediation of “third party”. Even though, the agreement were not guarantee the peace as many clashes still occur. However, in the last moment many people believed that the “Tsunami Disaster” is the key reason to make peace in Aceh. Since then both sides agree to stop the violent and begin the reconstruction and rehabilitation which affected by tsunami and military offence.


2. The Aceh Rebellion

The Acehnese have a strong sense of their distinctive identity favoured by the Islamic era and the Aceh-Dutch colonization war. At the time Indonesia gained its independence, Aceh integrated as a region in the new republic. Unfortunately, the different vision among Acehnese and Indonesian leaders (Soekarno’s government) in 1950s triggered the rebellion (Bertrand 2004, p. 163). Indonesian leaders could not accept the Islamic law in the new republic foundation nor did they accept special identity for Aceh region. The Indonesian leaders preferred to adopt unitary system equally in every region throughout Indonesia. During the period of 1950s to 1960s, Soekarno’s government agreed the practice of limited Islamic law to subdue the rebellion. Additionally, the Aceh region was recognized as a different province with new status as a Special Region. The Aceh rebellion then became divided in two parts since many Acehnese preferred to struggle in a compromise way. Furthermore, the population still suffered casualties during the conflict.

The “new order” era under Soeharto’s rule in 1966 reduced the special status of Aceh. At that time Soeharto’s policies were based on a centralized strong government of national uniformity, economic development and the strength of military force. The richness of natural resources in Aceh made the region as the target for economic development (Bertrand 2004, p. 170). Therefore many Aceh’s oil and gas resources were exploited; however, few Acehnese populations got benefits from this economic activity. The profits of this sector were mainly brought out of Aceh to Jakarta as the central government. Moreover, the military forces were used by the central government to ensure the security of the oil manufactures.

The unjust exploitation of Aceh’s natural resources led to the launching of the separatist movement, which is called the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM), in 1976. In 1989, Soeharto’s government increased the military offensive toward GAM with Military Operations Zone policy. About 1000-3000 people were killed and 1400 missing during the operations until 1992 (ICG 2001; cited by Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p. 6). Although GAM was largely defeated, troops remained in the province and antagonism toward Jakarta became deeply entrenched.


3. The Indonesian Political Crisis

In 1997, Indonesia experienced a serious political and economic crisis. The central government collapsed and loosed its power among the subordinate regions. One of the worse impacts was the disintegration of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999. At the same time the anti military and anti-Jakarta sentiment grew in Aceh (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p. 8). GAM position became strong and they recruited many new members. The new conflict occurred where GAM triggered the assassinations to local officers and military personnel. In addition, Aceh Referendum Information Centre (SIRA) was formed in 1999. They took action to strike and demand referendum for independence. This paralysed the local government and military forces. In late 1999, the parliament granted a special autonomy law for Aceh. However, it had little impact upon the conflict and a dialogue was commenced.


4. The Humanitarian Pause Agreement

The newly elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, decided on October 1999 to move forward negotiations with GAM. On January 2000, Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) was appointed by the Indonesian Government as third party to resolve the dispute. HDC believed that the dialogue should seek the peaceful solutions for conflicts which focused on humanitarian issues so that both sides could build trust (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p. 10). This opportunity was taken by GAM to expose human abuse in Aceh globally. On the other hand, dealing with the rebels was important for Indonesia to recover its reputation.

In May 2000, The Humanitarian Pause agreement was signed in Geneva. This aimed to allow the humanitarian service to help people who suffered during the conflict. It also tried to promote confidence building measures toward a peaceful solution (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p. 14-15). However, this agreement was criticized by parliament because this would recognize GAM and weaken the central government’s position. In contrast GAM extended its operation and recruited new members throughout Aceh. The conflict between GAM and military troops continued, even though the number of casualties and the death toll in conflict decreased.


5. Military Offensive and Aceh Special Autonomy

When a presidential crisis occurred in April 2001, Jakarta attempted to force GAM to surrender by increasing troops and denied HDC involvement(Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p.21). The government claimed that GAM still attacked some vital infrastructure and petroleum assets, and they must do something to protect these. The government then issued a decree (President Instruction) to implement comprehensive measures to resolve Aceh conflict by increasing the number of troops.

In July 2001 the new president appointed, Megawati, to replace Abdurrahman Wahid. Her policy was also based on military and security solution. The number of casualties among civilians increased and GAM continued to be a significant aggressive force. One year later, Megawati approved a special autonomy law for Aceh which referred to Aceh as “Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam” (NAD). In its special autonomy, Aceh would receive bigger proportion of petroleum and gas revenue (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p. 25). This special autonomy also supported the practice of Islamic law and direct election for governor and district heads. This made Aceh different from the all other regions of Indonesia. Unfortunately, this law excluded GAM and made it difficult for GAM and its followers to accept.

Until early 2002, Megawati’s government seemed run very well and had strengthened its position. Therefore, the military offensive had pushed GAM to retreat to rural areas. Government believed that this action could demoralize GAM and force them to begin to negotiate seriously.


6. Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA)

Acehnese civil society groups demanded GAM leaders in Sweden to continue negotiations to reduce the casualties. They believed that GAM might lose public sympathy if it kept obstructing the peace process. In additionally, GAM experienced increased losses since the strengthening of military pressure and the ultimatum from government. In December 2002 the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), which was facilitated by HDC, was signed by both sides. It underlined two key points (Aspinall & Crouch 2003, p. 31):

1. Disarmament of GAM’s weapons to third party
2. Indonesia Paramilitary (Brimob) should be withdrawn form Aceh, since many GAM believed that this will threaten unarmed GAM members after agreement

This agreement was welcomed with enthusiasm in Indonesia and internationally. GAM and military commanders mixed together to cease offensive actions, and socialize the agreements. The number of casualties dropped drastically although in isolated areas some clashes still occurred. Furthermore, the creation of a peace zone in certain villages made condition more stable and people could run their business and daily activities securely.

Unfortunately, some generals stated their disappointment with the agreement and their stand not to tolerate with rebellion. Moreover, those key points are interpreted vaguely by two parties. As a result the disarmament of GAM and troop withdrawal was postponed within uncertainly time limits. Many people worried this would threaten the peace resolution.

In spite of the reduction of fatalities after the COHA agreement, the government had planned to continue the military offensive if the conditions became worse. HDC once again initiated talks in Tokyo and fully supported by the US and EU. Unfortunately, on 17th of May 2003 the peace negotiations failed, when GAM refused to accept the two key statements; acknowledge special autonomy in Aceh and abandon its struggle for independence. Indonesia government viewed the Tokyo Talks as a means to demonstrate to domestic and international audiences that they had exhausted all attempts at negotiation. Therefore, President Megawati signed the military emergency declaration to boost the number of troops and police by 50,000 (Renner 2006, p. 11).

During this decree, military and government aimed to win the Acehnese empathy by doing “integrated approach”. It combined military operations with other steps (law enforcement, humanitarian aid, restoring local government and economic recovery) (Schulz 2005; cited by Aspinall 2005, p.10). This includes implementation of Islamic law and improving military troop’s behaviour.






7. Tsunami Disaster

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected as new president in November 2004. He promised to bring peace in Aceh with “integrated approach”. With his vice president, Jusuf Kalla, they began to talk the new agreement which mediated by Crisis Management Initiative. This institution is headed by Martti Ahtisaari, former president of Finland who had a long career in the UN as a diplomat and mediator for peace process in Bosnia and Northern Ireland (Aspinall 2005, p. 19). At the time GAM and Indonesia began the negotiation, Aceh was hit by a devastating tsunami on 24 December 2004. About 170.000 people were death and missing, and suddenly Aceh became the centre of international humanitarian response (Renner 2006, p. 11). Both sides concern with this critical situation and agreed to cease hostilities to allow access for humanitarian aid and relief workers.

The post tsunami period was the time for GAM to consider the new negotiation. GAM had lost many of its members and was concerned about international aid in Aceh. Therefore they welcomed a renewal of negotiations. Meanwhile, Indonesia believed that the peace talks would be useful to accelerate recovery of infrastructure in Aceh and improve humanitarian activities. Since then, it is claimed that the tsunami disaster as the key factor for the success of the next negotiation. Both sides returned to the talks and offered greater concessions to sought “win-win solutions” (Renner 2006, p. 16).


8. Helsinki MoU

The first talk was held in Helsinki, 27th of January 2005, a month after the tsunami disaster. CMI had different fundamentally approach from that organized by HDC. While HDC had an open-designed process to indentify the common interest of both sides by ceasing hostilities, CMI reversed the order and used a formula in which “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” (Aspinall 2005, p. 23). This meant that a broad political statement must be agreed upon before the agreement could be implemented.

During the first negotiation, Indonesia’s goal was have GAM accepted the special autonomy status for Aceh whereas GAM’s goal simply a cease fire. It is very clear that Indonesia had stronger position than GAM and CMI viewed this as pressure for GAM to accept special autonomy within Indonesia’s territory (Aspinall 2005, p. 23). Therefore, Mr Ahtisaari explained that the basis of negotiations was the special autonomy status.

On the next negotiations, GAM demanded to have distinctive political movement (as transition from armament movement) so that GAM could establish its own local party. Therefore Indonesia agreed to revise NAD special autonomy law to ensure the “self-government” rule included local politics election (although, central government keep the greater authority in monetary, international affair, and security and defence). All non-local troops would be removed from Aceh to create stability and integration. Additionally, the amnesty would be given to all ex-GAM combatants and they would be granted rehabilitation as Indonesian citizen. On the other side, GAM would destroy its ammunitions and weapons, eliminate the use of GAM symbols and flag and fully accept the autonomy status.

At last, the memorandum of understanding was signed by the two parties on 15th of August 2005. The agreement also established a monitoring body in Aceh to oversee the changes. As a result, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) was formed by the ASEAN and European Union. It has greater authority to resolve the conflict and will be binding the parties.


9. Lessons

Aspinall and Crouch (2003, p.45) stated some points to understand about the peace process since 1997 – 2004:

a. The hardliners Indonesian commanders and the olders GAM sometimes obstruct the peace process with their comment in the media
b. The mediator in the early talks, HDC, was relatively inexperience and small NGO. The staffs have limited of local knowledge and communication
c. The negotiations excluded other Acehnese group of interest, such as SIRA or local NGO
d. The gradual recovery of the Indonesia military’s political make government confident to press GAM accept the talks
e. Indonesia government limited the involvement of other countries and United Nation, so that the conflict could not be recognized globally

On the other hand, Aspinall (2005, p. 49) concerned some potential spoilers after Helsinki MoU had been signed:

a. The opposition in Parliament who did not agree with the dialogue process with GAM and thought that GAM should not be compromised
b. The interest of military and its allies in illegal logging issues and oil industry. Because during the conflict, this party got much benefits from those activities and back up local officers from corruption
c. GAM commitment in the MoU is still untrustworthy, as many Indonesian believe that they keep the long term goal for independence.


10. Conclusion

The third party had significant contribution to end the conflict between GAM and Indonesian since the reformation era in 1997. After the replacement of HDC to CMI in peace talk process, CMI had successfully ended the conflict by the agreement of Helsinki MoU in 15th of August 2006. Beside the contribution of the third party, many people believed that the tsunami disaster also play significant role to affect both parties to begin renewal dialogue. It is necessary to address their commitment where it had stated in the agreement in order to build trustful and create infinity peace in Aceh’s region.